The Unjustified Subsidy: Sovereign Wealth Funds the Foreign Sovereign Tax Exemption by Jennifer Bird-Pollan
Fordham Journal of Corporate &
Financial Law
Volume 17, Number 4 2012 Article 3
The Unjustified Subsidy: Sovereign Wealth
Funds the Foreign Sovereign Tax Exemption
Jennifer Bird-Pollan∗
∗
Copyright c©2012 by the authors. Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law is produced
by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/jcfl
The Unjustified Subsidy: Sovereign Wealth
Funds the Foreign Sovereign Tax Exemption∗
Jennifer Bird-Pollan
Abstract
The taxation of Sovereign Wealth Funds in the United States is outmoded and due for re-
consideration. Offering a tax exemption to the billion dollar investment funds owned by foreign
governments is both unfair and ineffective. Founded in the principles of sovereign immunity, the
foreign sovereign tax exemption, codified in I.R.C. §892, fails to satisfy the Congressional goals
that motivated its creation. This Article explains the current taxation of foreign sovereigns and, by
extension, Sovereign Wealth Funds. It then illustrates that the current exemption is simultaneously
too broad, providing a tax exemption for activities that are clearly nongovernmental activities, and
therefore outside of the realm of sovereign immunity, and too narrow, failing to provide a tax ex-
emption for activities that clearly are governmental activities. Finally, this Article explains that
any exemption provided to foreign sovereigns should be offered only as a treaty matter, reserving
the privilege as a negotiation tool, and thereby ensuring that the United States receives similar
benefits.
KEYWORDS: Tax, Taxation, Law, Corporate, Business, Exemption, Foreign, Governments, In-
vestment, Sovereign, Immunity, Congress, Wealth Funds
∗Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. This Article benefited from
comments provided by participants in the SEALS New Scholars Workshop, the Law, Society and
Taxation workshop, the University of Cincinnati College of Law faculty brown bag workshop, and
the University of Kentucky College of Law faculty brown bag lunch workshop. Special thanks to
Professors Allison Christians, Daniel Halperin and Stephen Shay for their insightful comments.
Thanks also to the editorial staff of the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law for their
diligent work.
VOLUME XVII 2012 NUMBER 4 
 
FORDHAM 
JOURNAL OF 
CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE UNJUSTIFIED SUBSIDY: SOVEREIGN WEALTH 
FUNDS AND THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN 
TAX EXEMPTION 
 
Jennifer Bird-Pollan 
  987
 
THE UNJUSTIFIED SUBSIDY: 
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS AND THE 
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN TAX EXEMPTION 
 
Jennifer Bird-Pollan* 
ABSTRACT 
The taxation of Sovereign Wealth Funds in the United States is 
outmoded and due for reconsideration. Offering a tax exemption to 
the billion dollar investment funds owned by foreign governments is 
both unfair and ineffective. Founded in the principles of sovereign 
immunity, the foreign sovereign tax exemption, codified in I.R.C. § 
892, fails to satisfy the Congressional goals that motivated its 
creation. This Article explains the current taxation of foreign 
sovereigns and, by extension, Sovereign Wealth Funds. It then 
illustrates that the current exemption is simultaneously too broad, 
providing a tax exemption for activities that are clearly non-
governmental activities, and therefore outside of the realm of 
sovereign immunity, and too narrow, failing to provide a tax 
exemption for activities that clearly are governmental activities. 
Finally, this Article explains that any exemption provided to foreign 
sovereigns should be offered only as a treaty matter, reserving the 
privilege as a negotiation tool, and thereby ensuring that the United 
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INTRODUCTION 
Investment in the United States by Sovereign Wealth Funds 
(“SWFs”) has grown significantly in recent years.1 Several high profile 
deals have brought this activity into the headlines and have started 
conversations about just what SWFs should or should not be permitted 
to do.2 However, despite this evolving attitude toward investment in the 
United States by foreign governments and the growing presence of 
SWFs in the U.S. economy, the taxation of SWFs and the related policy 
rationales are sorely outdated. Section 892 of the Internal Revenue Code 
                                                                                                                 
 1. For a discussion of the growth of SWFs and examples of specific well-
publicized investments by SWFs in the United States in recent years see Joint Comm. 
on Tax’n, Economic and U.S. Income Tax Issues Raised by Sovereign Wealth Fund 
Investment in the United States, JCX-49-08, at 1 (June 17, 2008); Victor Fleischer, A 
Theory of Taxing Sovereign Wealth, 84 N.Y.U.L. REV. 440, 441-42 (2009); William M. 
Funk, On and Over the Horizon: Emerging Issues in U.S. Taxation of Investments, 10 
HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 1, 7-8 (2010); Michael S. Knoll, Taxation and the 
Competitiveness of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Do Taxes Encourage Sovereign Wealth 
Funds to Invest in the United States, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 703, 703-05 (2009); Luca 
Schicho, Pride and Prejudice: How the Financial Crisis Made Us Reconsider SWFs, 2 
GOETTINGEN J. INT’L. L. 63, 65-70 (2010). 
 2. See, e.g., Funk, supra note 1; Schicho, supra note 1. 
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(the section that provides a tax exemption to foreign governments, and, 
by extension, to SWFs) has remained substantially unchanged since it 
was written in 1917.3  Now is the time to re-examine the U.S. tax 
treatment of foreign governments and SWFs to ensure that our tax law 
reflects and encourages the general U.S. policy towards investment by 
foreign governments and SWFs in particular.4 
In this Article, I demonstrate that the current statutory structure 
offers SWFs a tax exemption that is both unfair (because it allows 
foreign governments to earn investment income in the United States 
without paying tax on that income while not offering a similar 
exemption to other similarly situated taxpayers) and incomplete 
(because currently the statute does not provide a complete exemption for 
income connected with the sovereign activities of foreign governments, 
which is the rationale for providing the exemption in the first place). I 
will reevaluate historical justifications for offering a tax exemption to 
foreign governments to show that those justifications are not served by 
the current form of the exemption. I begin by carefully outlining the 
current tax treatment of SWFs. I then demonstrate why this statutory 
framework fails to promote good U.S. tax policy. Finally, I identify an 
alternative statutory model that more adequately satisfies U.S. tax and 
foreign policy goals. 
Good tax policy might justify offering foreign governments a lower 
rate of tax than foreign private investors.5 What I point to in this Article, 
however, is that preferential rates for foreign governments and their 
investing SWFs should be offered, if at all, only after careful 
consideration by Congress, or by tax treaty negotiators. The current 
model is an historical accident and both over-taxes and under-taxes 
foreign governments earning income in the United States. 
Based on the justification of sovereign immunity, the model 
adopted by the U.S. tax Code offers a tax exemption to foreign 
governments who earn income in their governmental capacity, but taxes 
                                                                                                                 
 3. Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended as of the date of this Article 
[hereafter “Code”]. All citations to sections are citations to the Code unless otherwise 
noted. 
 4. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the non-tax policy concerns regarding 
investment by SWFs and foreign governments in the U.S. 
 5. Id. Part II.C.1 of this paper discusses policy arguments for lowering the tax rate 
on investment for foreign governments investing in the U.S. 
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income earned from any so-called “commercial activity.”6 However, 
despite the intention of taxing foreign governments in this way, the 
actual language of the Code exempts income earned from certain 
activities that ought to be treated as commercial,7 while simultaneously 
taxing income earned by a foreign government engaging in activities 
that are central to its sovereign role.8 Targeted changes to the Code 
could fix both of these problems, thereby both raising revenue by taxing 
foreign governments when they ought to be taxed and honoring 
sovereign immunity when governments are acting in a sovereign 
capacity. 
I. FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY 
One of the basic rules of tax policy is that a good policy will 
impose tax fairly among taxpayers.9 That is to say, taxpayers in similar 
situations will have similar tax bills (so-called horizontal equity), and 
taxpayers who are meaningfully differently situated financially will have 
proportionately different tax bills (vertical equity).10 One of the primary 
rationales for relying on horizontal equity and fairness more generally is 
that observing equity principles allows the government to raise 
necessary revenue while, at the same time, increasing social equality.11  
                                                                                                                 
 6. See infra Part II.C. for a discussion of the U.S. tax treatment of foreign 
governments and SWFs. 
 7. See infra Part II.C.3 for a detailed account of the taxation of foreign 
governments’ investment income. 
 8. See infra Part V for a discussion of the current set of rules that inadvertently 
taxes foreign governments earning income while engaging in sovereign activities. 
 9. An in-depth discussion of vertical and horizontal equity is clearly outside of the 
scope of this paper. For further discussion of the general concept of horizontal equity, 
as well as more general discussions of the issues present in creating good tax policy, 
see, e.g., JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO 
THE DEBATE OVER TAXES (4th ed. 2008); Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social 
Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 
1905 (1987); Eric M. Zolt, The Uneasy Case for Uniform Taxation 16 VA. TAX REV. 
39, 86-98 (1996). 
 10. “[E]conomists call horizontal equity, the principle that tax liability ought to be 
the same for any two families with the same level of well-being – equal treatment of 
equals.” Slemrod & Bakija, supra note 9, at 89. It should be noted, however, that there 
is a significant line of argument in the tax policy literature debating the role of 
horizontal equity in analyzing tax policy choices. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Horizontal 
Equity: Measures in Search of Principle, 42 NAT’L TAX J. 113 (1990). 
 11. Slemrod & Bakija, supra note 9 at 87-90. 
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However, this focus on levels of fairness in the domestic context does 
not necessarily clarify what role “fairness” should have in evaluating 
international tax policy.12 My concern in this Article, however, is not so 
much whether we unduly burden international investors earning income 
in the United States, but whether we offer unjustified tax preferences to 
those investors, thereby both lowering tax revenues and increasing 
unfairness in the domestic context. Because the focus of this Article 
involves tax preferences offered to foreign government investors (and 
not to any other taxpayers), it is useful at this point to examine why, 
from a fairness perspective, this might be unjustified. 
As a general rule, a tax preference (a lower tax rate, tax credit or 
deduction) should only be provided if it contributes to a particular policy 
goal.13 Indeed any tax preference that gives certain taxpayers a lower tax 
bill than other similarly situated taxpayers is likely a violation of 
horizontal equity.14 However, if that preference can be justified because 
of the other policy goals that it advances, then Congress may decide to 
violate horizontal equity in order to achieve that other goal.15 Examples 
of such action by Congress in the Code include the deduction for home 
mortgage interest,16 the education tax credits,17 and the accelerated 
                                                                                                                 
 12. See, e.g., J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Fairness 
in International Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 
FLA. TAX. REV. 4 (2001) (arguing that ability to pay is a relevant consideration when 
evaluating world-wide versus territorial taxation for United States citizens and 
residents). 
 13. Slemrod & Bakija, supra note 9, at 89. 
 14. However, importantly, it is difficult to determine on what criteria we might 
judge situatedness (and its similarity) for horizontal equity purposes when one of the 
taxpayers in question is a foreign government. For a discussion of the difficulty of 
determining “likeness” when one of the taxpayers being analyzed is a non-resident, see 
Fleming, Peroni & Shay, supra note 12, at 314. 
 15. See id. 
 16. § 163(h). This deduction allows homeowners to deduct amounts they spend in 
interest on their home mortgages. As a result, homeowners will typically have lower tax 
bills then other taxpayers who are in the same situation in every respect except that they 
rent their homes. The policy goal of this provision is to encourage home ownership 
among American taxpayers. For an analysis of the effectiveness of this Code section 
and this policy more generally, see Dennis J. Ventry, Jr. The Accidental Deduction: A 
History and Critique of the Tax Subsidy for Mortgage Interest, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROB. 233 (2010). 
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depreciation rules.18  Without a clear policy goal, a violation of 
horizontal equity would seem to violate one of the central premises of 
U.S. tax policy.19  This Article will proceed on this assumption. Indeed, 
the ultimate conclusion of this Article will be that there is no clear non-
tax policy goal that justifies giving a tax preference to the investment 
income of foreign governments and their SWFs over and above the tax 
treatment of foreign private investors.20 
                                                                                                                 
 17. § 25A. The Hope and Lifetime Learning Credits are tax credits available to 
taxpayers who are enrolled in higher education programs and pay tuition for those 
programs. The Hope Credit is only available for the first two years of post-secondary 
education, while the Lifetime Learning Credit is available for any other enrolled 
student. There are additional limitations based on adjusted gross income and applies to 
qualified tuition and related expenses. The policy behind these tax credits is clear 
enough—the credits are in place to facilitate lower-income individuals’ enrollment in 
higher education courses. For further discussion of these credits, see generally Kerry A. 
Ryan, Access Assured: Restoring Progressivity in the Tax and Spending Programs for 
Higher Education, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (2008); Sean Stegmaier Tax Incentives for 
Higher Education in the Internal Revenue Code: Education Tax Expenditure Reform 
and the Inclusion of Refundable Tax Credits, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 135 (2008). 
 18. § 179. This section allows businesses to take up to $500,000 (for the remainder 
of 2011 – the limitation is currently scheduled to drop to $125,000 in 2012 and to 
$25,000 for taxable years beginning after 2012) of depreciation as an expense in the 
year in which the property is placed into service. Intended to encourage capital 
expenditures in the face of a recession, the rule has received mixed reviews regarding 
its effectiveness. For more discussion of §179 and its implications, see Gabriel 
Aitsebaomo, The Individual Alternative Minimum Tax and the Intersection of the Bush 
Tax Cuts: A Proposal for Permanent Reform 23 AKRON TAX J. 109 (2008); James 
Edward Maule, No Thanks, Uncle Sam, You Can Keep Your Tax Break, 31 SETON HALL 
LEGIS. J. 81 (2006). 
 19. See generally Slemrod & Bakija, supra note 9, at 89. On the other hand, the 
explosion of tax expenditures means that Congress quite regularly decides to violate its 
equity goals in the name of policy.  Tax expenditure analysis, the procedure by which 
the Code is analyzed from the perspective of the services and subsidies provided 
through it, was introduced by Stanley S. Surrey. STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO 
TAX REFORM (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1973). For a discussion of 
the application of tax expenditure analysis to the international tax world, see J. Clifton 
Fleming, Jr., & Robert J. Peroni, Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis and its 
International Dimension, 27 VA. TAX REV. 437 (2008). 
 20. As a matter of horizontal equity and fairness in tax policy more generally, it 
may be that the current tax treatment of foreign private investors ought to be changed as 
well. However, that discussion is outside of the scope of this paper. For a discussion of 
how to evaluate fairness in international tax policy more generally, see generally 
Fleming, Peroni & Shay, supra note 12. 
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II. TAXATION OF SWFS 
In this Article, I argue for the elimination of the current tax 
preferences offered to SWFs. However, in order to understand the 
problems with the current approach to taxing SWFs, one must first 
understand just what is at stake. Therefore, this Part will explain the 
current taxation of foreign governments generally, and SWFs in 
particular. This journey requires a short detour into the world of non-
resident taxpayers and a side trip into a discussion of “commercial 
activity income,” a concept that applies only in the taxation of foreign 
sovereigns. 
A. WHAT IS A SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND? 
There is still no universally recognized definition of the term 
“Sovereign Wealth Fund.”21 International organizations like the 
International Monetary Fund (the “IMF”), the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (the “OECD”) and the 
European Central Bank, however, have working definitions.22 SWFs 
generally operate like private equity funds, pooling capital for purposes 
                                                                                                                 
 21. See Fleischer, supra, note 1, at 453-55 (noting that it is unclear what exactly 
counts as a SWF). 
 22. The IMF identifies five possible types of SWF: “(i) stabilization funds, where 
the primary objective is to insulate the budget and the economy against commodity 
(usually oil) price swings; (ii) savings funds for future generations, which aim to 
convert nonrenewable assets into a more diversified portfolio of assets . . . (iii) reserve 
investment corporations, whose assets are often still counted as reserve assets, and are 
established to increase the return on reserves; (iv) development funds, which typically 
help fund socio-economic projects or promote industrial policies that might raise a 
country’s potential output growth; and (v) contingent pension reserve funds, which 
provide (from sources other than individual pension contributions) for contingent 
unspecified pension liabilities on the government’s balance sheet.” Int’l Monetary Fund 
Sovereign Wealth Funds – A Work Agenda 5 (Feb. 29, 2008), available at 
www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2008/022908.pdf. The European Central Bank defines 
an SWF as “[a] special investment fund created/owned by a government to hold assets 
for long-term purposes; it is typically funded from reserves or other foreign-currency 
sources, including commodity export revenues, and predominantly has significant 
ownership of foreign currency claims on non-residents.” European Central Bank, 
Financial Stability Review 178 (June 2009), available at www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/fin 
ancialstabilityreview200906en.pdf. 
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of investment.23  However, unlike their private equity fund counterparts, 
the capital invested by SWFs is entirely owned by a sovereign entity. 
For U.S. tax purposes, and for purposes of this Article, the only entities 
that qualify as SWFs are those that are wholly owned by foreign 
governments and are otherwise eligible for § 892 benefits.24 In addition, 
the financial benefits of the SWF’s income must not inure to any private 
persons.25  Finally, in order to qualify for the benefits of the foreign 
sovereign tax exemption in the United States, SWFs must not be 
engaged in commercial activity anywhere in the world.26 
 
B. U.S. TAX TREATMENT OF FOREIGN PRIVATE CORPORATE 
INVESTORS IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
The United States’ system of taxation imposes income taxes based 
on both citizenship and residency criteria.27 That is to say, United States 
citizens and residents are taxed on their worldwide income.28 Non-U.S. 
citizens who are also non-residents, but who earn income that comes 
                                                                                                                 
 23. “Broadly speaking . . . SWFs are actively managed, government-owned pools 
of capital originating in foreign exchange assets.” Joint Comm. on Tax’n, supra note 1, 
at 21-22. 
 24. In order to qualify for the foreign sovereign tax exemption provided by § 892, 
an entity must be a controlled entity. A controlled entity “means an entity that is 
separate in form from a foreign sovereign or otherwise constitutes a separate juridical 
entity if it satisfies the following requirements: (i) [i]t is wholly owned and controlled 
by a foreign sovereign directly or indirectly through one or more controlled entities; (ii) 
[i]t is organized under the laws of the foreign sovereign by which [it is] owned; (iii) 
[i]ts net earnings are credited to its own account or to other accounts of the foreign 
sovereign, with no portion of its income inuring to the benefit of any private person; 
and (iv) [i]ts assets vest in the foreign sovereign upon dissolution.” Temp. Treas. Reg. § 
892-2T(a)(3). SWFs that satisfy these requirements qualify as controlled entities, and 
therefore are eligible for the foreign sovereign tax exemption provided by § 892. 
 25. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.892-2T(a)(2). Note that all of the Treasury Regulations 
under § 892 are temporary. The applicable Regulations (Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.892-
1T—1.892-7T) were adopted as Temporary Regulations in 1986 by § 1247 of the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986, Pub.L. 99-514, § 1247, 100 Stat. 2085, 2583, and have not yet 
been made permanent. 
 26. §§ 892(a)(2)(A)(ii), 892(a)(2)(B). For a discussion of “commercial activity,” 
see infra Part III.  
 27. See, e.g., §§ 861, 871, 872. 
 28. § 61. 
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from a U.S. source are taxed in the United States on that income.29  
However, by contrast with U.S. citizens and residents, non-residents are 
not taxed on their worldwide income, but generally are only required to 
report and pay tax to the United States government on U.S.-source 
income and certain other income connected to a U.S. business.30 This 
model of taxation echoes the general source/residence divide found 
throughout the world.31 Generally, countries assess income taxes on all 
income that is earned within their borders.32 In the United States, “U.S. 
source income” includes any payment for services that are provided in 
the United States, or any investment income (such as dividend payments 
or interest income) that is generated from U.S. based investments.33  
Generally, non-residents are also taxed in the United States on 
income that is effectively connected to a U.S. trade or business (so-
called “effectively connected income” or “ECI”).34 ECI is taxed at the 
same ordinary income rates to which U.S. citizens and residents are 
subject.35 In addition, nonresidents subject to taxation on ECI are 
eligible to take deductions against their income, resulting in a net, rather 
than gross, income tax.36 The goal of the ECI rules taxing nonresidents 
                                                                                                                 
 29. See § 871 and § 872 for the taxation of non-resident individuals and § 881 and 
§ 882 for the taxation of non-resident corporations. 
 30. Id. Section 861 identifies which items of income will be treated as income from 
sources within the United States, while § 862 identifies items treated as income from 
sources without the United States. 
 31. See, e.g., RICHARD L. DOERNBERG, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION IN A NUTSHELL, 
7 (9th ed. 2012). 
 32. The source of income is typically attributed to the jurisdiction in which it is 
derived.  This is not always obvious, and the source of income can be the cause of some 
dispute.  For a discussion of the ways in which taxpayers attempt to take advantage of 
complicated source rules and the gaps between the source rules of various countries, see 
Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699 (2011). 
 33. §§ 861 (identifying income from sources within the United States), 862 
(identifying income from sources without the United States), 863 (explaining the 
allocation rules for income partially from within and partially from without the United 
States), and 865 (explaining the rules for determining the source of gain from the sale 
of a capital asset). 
 34. For the definition of “trade or business within the United States,” see § 864(b). 
For the imposition of tax on a non-resident alien on income connected with a United 
States trade or business, see § 871(b). 
 35. §§ 871(b), 882. 
 36. §§ 861(b), 871(b), 873, 882. 
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at resident rates on their U.S. trade or business income is meant to 
encourage fairness and competitiveness between nonresidents and 
residents. In other words, the tax rules should not provide an unjustified 
competitive advantage to those who are exempt from tax, eligible to take 
deductions so that they are taxed on net rather than gross income, or 
who otherwise receive competitive advantages merely based on tax 
treatment. Without clear policy goals indicating otherwise, the 
obligation to pay taxes should not put a taxpayer at a disadvantage, as 
compared with another individual who is entitled to a tax exemption. 
One relevant example of this distinction is found in the world of tax-
exempt non-profit entities.37  A tax-exemption is provided to non-profit 
entities for all income earned by the entity in connection with its 
charitable purpose.38 However, if the non-profit earns income from an 
“unrelated business” then that income is subject to taxation at the same 
rates as a for-profit entity.39  The rationale for this rule is that U.S. tax 
policy should not provide a business advantage to non-profit entities 
engaging in business outside of their charitable purposes.40 The same 
rationale applies in the international tax context. The tax on ECI 
attempts to put U.S. taxable businesses and their foreign-owned 
competitors operating and earning income in the United States on a tax-
neutral playing field.41  
By contrast with the rule for ECI, non-residents are typically 
exempted in the United States from tax on gain from the sale of a capital 
                                                                                                                 
 37. §§ 511, 512. 
 38. § 501. 
 39. Id. 
 40. For an in-depth discussion of the role that the unrelated business income tax 
plays in effecting the competitiveness of businesses operated by tax-exempt entities, see 
Michael S. Knoll, The UBIT: Leveling an Uneven Playing Field or Tilting a Level 
One?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 857 (2007). 
 41. In addition to the goal of tax neutrality, there are jurisdictional limits to the 
U.S. taxation of non-resident businesses. If a non-resident business earns income 
outside of the United States, then, for the most part, that income will not be subject to 
United States tax. In that sense then, the U.S. business is at a tax disadvantage, 
especially if the non-resident is only subject to tax at a lower rate than the United States 
tax rate. However, the U.S. lacks the jurisdictional authority to draw that non-U.S. 
source income into the U.S. in order to tax it. For a more detailed discussion of this 
issue, see Stephen E. Shay, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., & Robert J. Peroni, “What’s Source 
Got to Do With It?” Source Rules and U.S. International Taxation, 56 TAX L. REV. 81 
(2002). 
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asset.42  Because of this rule, appreciation on U.S. stock owned by a 
foreign investor goes untaxed in the United States.43 The effective tax 
exemption provided by this jurisdictional rule can make investing in the 
United States particularly attractive to foreign investors.44 
While non-resident taxpayers are subject to U.S. tax on their ECI, 
and generally exempt from U.S. tax on their capital gain income, there is 
a general rule that income that is fixed, determinable, annual or periodic 
(“FDAP income”) is subjected to a 30% withholding rate.45 Examples of 
                                                                                                                 
 42. §§ 865.  See also §§ 881, 882 (identifying the items of income subject to tax on 
non-residents engaged in a trade or business in the United States and on non-residents 
not engaged in a trade or business in the United States, and omitting capital gain as an 
item of income). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-2(b)(2)(i) (excepting gains on the sale 
of capital assets from the withholding rules). This treatment of capital gain stems from 
generally accepted jurisdictional rules about the source of income. Capital gain is 
typically sourced to the residence country of the seller. In the case of a non-resident 
taxpayer, therefore, any capital gain earned on a sale is not taxed in the United States. 
One exception to this general rule lies in the world of real property interests. § 897 
taxes non-residents on income earned from the sale of real property interests to the 
seller’s residency, even though that income, as capital gain income, would otherwise be 
sourced outside the U.S. An additional exception to the general rule is found in the rules 
related to the sale of inventory property. Unlike the sale of other kinds of personal 
property, the sale of inventory property retains a “title passage” rule, so that income is 
sourced to the country where title passes. § 861(a)(6). Therefore, if a non-resident sells 
inventory property in the U.S., that income will be sourced here, and she will likely be 
taxed on any gain. 
 43. Gain earned by a U.S. taxpayer on the sale of a capital asset in the U.S. is 
currently taxed at preferential rates. §1(h). This is one aspect of the current system of 
corporate double taxation, which assesses an income tax at the level of the corporation 
and also assesses a tax at the shareholder level. The distribution of profits results in a 
tax on dividends, but if the corporation retains profits, then typically the share price 
increases, and there will be capital gain on the sale of the stock, which is taxed at 
capital gain rates. One argument for lower rates for capital gains and dividends is that 
this income is taxed twice in the United States.  For an explanation of the operation of 
the double corporate tax and an argument that the U.S. corporate tax is “unusual, unfair 
and inefficient,” see Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of 
Corporate Taxation, 105 YALE L. J. 325, 326 (1995).  However, since capital gain 
realized by non-residents escapes this second level of taxation, it may be time to revisit 
this issue. That is, however, outside of the scope of this Article. 
 44. See § 865(a). Since § 865(a) sources gain to the seller’s residency, if a resident 
of a country with very low or no income tax earns income on the sale of a stock of a 
U.S. company, that seller may avoid tax on the gain altogether. 
 45. §§ 871(a), 881(a). 
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FDAP income include dividends, rents, royalties and interest payments, 
among other things.46 With regard to dividends, this 30% withholding 
rate represents a significant deviation from the current 15% tax on 
dividend income that is assessed on the income of U.S. taxpayers.47 In 
many instances, non-resident taxpayers who are residents of countries 
with whom the United States has a tax treaty will get the benefit of a 
dividend withholding rate that is reduced by the treaty.48  Most 
commonly, the treaty reduces the withholding rate on non-residents to 
15%.49 Because of the “withholding” nature of the tax, the obligation to 
collect the tax lies with the income payor.50 If a non-resident believes 
she is exempt from the tax, or otherwise eligible for some rate other than 
the 30% rate, then she must submit documentation to the payor 
establishing the reasons the payor should withhold a reduced amount.51 
In addition to the treaty reduction on the dividend withholding rate, 
non-residents receive a tax benefit with regard to most interest that they 
receive.52 As a general matter, interest income is FDAP income, which 
                                                                                                                 
 46. § 881(a). 
 47. See § 61. Note that this rate is part of the EGTRRA tax cuts, which are 
currently in place through December 2012, at which point this reduced tax rate may 
increase. It is unclear at the time of this writing whether or not this reduced rate will be 
extended. 
 48. Tax treaties are international agreements signed by the United States and the 
governing authority of a foreign country. Their authority controls the taxation of each 
country’s citizens in the jurisdiction of the other signing country. 
 49. Generally dividend withholding rates set by treaty are reduced to 15%, but 
some countries have signed treaties with the United States that reduce the withholding 
rate to a different percentage. Currently reduced dividend withholding rates are in place 
in the tax treaties that the United States has signed with Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, 
Barbados, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel (25%), Italy, Jamaica, Japan (10%), Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and Venezuela. 
In each case, see Article 10 of the appropriate treaty except for Israel and Iceland, 
where the appropriate provision appears in Article 12, available at http://www.irs.gov 
/businesses/international/article/0,,id=96739,00.html. 
 50. §§ 1441, 1442. 
 51. Treas. Reg. §1.1441-1(b)(3). 
 52. See § 871. Note that this is a statutory provision, so eligibility for the tax 
benefit is not contingent on eligibility to claim the benefits of a tax treaty, as the 
reduced dividend withholding rate is. 
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would be subject to the applicable 30% withholding rate.53 However, 
U.S. source interest received by a non-resident that qualifies as 
“portfolio interest” is exempt from the U.S. income tax.54 The portfolio 
interest rules apply to recipients of interest income who are not 10% 
shareholders in the entity that issues the note on which the interest is 
paid.55  Also, interest that non-residents earn in the United States on 
bank deposits or other kinds of short-term interest are exempted from 
tax.56 
C. U.S. TAX TREATMENT OF FOREIGN SOVEREIGNS 
The default treatment of foreign sovereigns earning income in the 
United States is that they are treated as foreign corporations resident in 
their home countries.57  This means that, regardless of what additional 
tax benefits are afforded to foreign sovereigns, under the current rules, 
foreign sovereigns who invest in the United States will be eligible for 
                                                                                                                 
 53. § 871(a) imposes this tax. 
 54. §§ 871(h)(2), 881(c). 
 55. § 871(h)(3)(B) The statute provides that “[t]he term ‘10-percent shareholder’ 
means – (i) in the case of an obligation issued by a corporation, any person who owns 
10 percent or more of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock of such 
corporation entitled to vote, or (ii) in the case of an obligation issued by a partnership, 
any person who owns 10 percent or more of the capital or profits interest in such 
partnership.” The Code goes on to apply the traditional § 318 attribution rules in 
determining 10-percent ownership in this context. See § 871(h)(3)(C). 
 56. § 871(i)(2)(A). 
 57. § 892(a)(3). The statute provides that “[f]or purposes of this title, a foreign 
government shall be treated as a corporate resident of its country. A foreign government 
shall be so treated for purposes of any income tax treaty obligation of the United States 
if such government grants equivalent treatment to the Government of the United 
States.” This second sentence is especially noteworthy, since it is a statutory reference 
to the treaty status of a foreign government. This provides a precedent for the central 
argument of this Article: that the United States should not be offering a tax benefit to a 
foreign government if that government does not offer the same benefit back to the U.S. 
for income earned by the U.S. in that country. The result of this rule is that foreign 
sovereigns will not receive worse tax treatment in the U.S. than the corporate residents 
of that country receive. This provision also ensures that foreign sovereigns are eligible 
for treaty relief, where that relief is provided to corporate citizens of the relevant 
country. 
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the tax regime explicated in the previous section.58 However, the U.S. 
tax Code offers additional tax benefits to foreign sovereigns, their 
controlled entities, and their integral parts.59 I will now turn to a 
discussion of these additional benefits, but will first discuss the rationale 
for providing a foreign sovereign tax exemption.  
 
1. Why Offer an Additional Tax Advantage to Foreign Sovereigns? 
 
One might ask why the United States would want to provide any 
additional tax benefits to foreign sovereigns above and beyond the 
benefits that are provided to nonresident taxpayers generally. The 
answer is historical, and refers back to the general idea of sovereign 
immunity.60 Traditionally in the United States, foreign sovereigns have 
been found to be exempt from U.S. jurisdiction.61 This meant that 
foreign sovereigns were exempt from both the jurisdiction of U.S. courts 
and the jurisdiction of the U.S. taxing authorities.62 “Since the beginning 
of the modern federal income tax, the United States has treated 
sovereign immunity from taxation as a corollary to the general principle 
of sovereign immunity.”63 While this originally applied to all actions 
taken by a foreign sovereign within the United States’ borders, Congress 
eventually decided to subject foreign sovereigns to the jurisdiction of 
U.S. courts when they act in a commercial capacity.64  This same 
                                                                                                                 
 58. Since they are treated as corporate residents of their home countries, foreign 
governments are eligible for all the income tax benefits available to foreign 
corporations. These include the portfolio interest benefits of § 881 and the general rule 
that capital gain is not taxed to a non-resident corporation. Interestingly, any treaty 
reduction of the statutory 30% withholding rate on FDAP income will only be available 
to a foreign government if that government treats the U.S. government as a foreign 
corporation, for purposes of its income tax rules. See supra note 49 and the 
accompanying text for a discussion of the dividend withholding reduction treaty 
provisions. 
 59. See § 892. 
 60. For a discussion of the issue of sovereign immunity and its relation to the 
question of tax treatment of foreign governments, see Gregory May, The Foreign 
Sovereign Tax Exemption, TAX NOTES 389 (Jan. 19, 2009) at 390. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id (“Borne on winds stirred by the mid-century rise of political systems that 
treated entire economies as public enterprises, a restrictive theory of sovereign 
immunity began to etch a distinction between foreign governments’ public activities 
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treatment then appeared in the tax Code.65 Sovereign immunity and this 
judicial and tax treatment of foreign sovereigns operating within 
domestic borders are not entirely uniform.66 That is, many countries 
other than the United States offer judicial but not tax immunity to 
foreign sovereigns.67 
The effect of the United States choosing to treat foreign sovereigns 
as corporate residents of their countries is that any additional tax rules 
regarding foreign sovereigns will merely improve their tax treatment.68 
At worst, foreign sovereigns will default to the tax rules applicable to 
foreign corporations resident in that country.69 This is a policy decision. 
There might very well be reasons to tax foreign sovereigns more heavily 
(or less heavily) than we tax foreign private investors.70 I will discuss 
this issue later in this Article.71 
                                                                                                                 
(public acts) and what seemed to be their commercial activities (private acts).”) 
(internal citation omitted). 
 65. For a thorough discussion of the history of the exemption, and the relation 
between the general principles of sovereign immunity and immunity from tax, see 
Fleischer, supra note 1, at 457-61; May, supra note 60, at 389-91. 
 66. May, supra note 60, at 389. 
 67. Id. 
 68. A foreign government can always be treated as a foreign corporation for tax 
purposes because that is the default treatment for such entities. If the foreign 
government is eligible for any other tax preference beyond that baseline, it will merely 
serve to improve the foreign government’s tax result. 
 69. Importantly, this rule may result in foreign governments receiving better tax 
treatment than foreign corporations resident in another country. For instance, if country 
A has many favorable treaty provisions that apply to its resident corporations, but 
country B does not have such provisions in its treaty with the U.S., or has no treaty in 
place with the U.S., then country A’s government will receive better tax treatment than 
a corporation resident in country B. In addition, country A’s government will receive 
better tax treatment than country B’s government. 
 70. For a discussion of why a rational foreign policy might involve a heavier tax on 
foreign governments than on foreign private investors, see Fleischer, supra note 1, at 
480-94 (identifying the positive and negative externalities associated with departing 
from the so-called “neutrality norm” with regard to taxation of foreign sovereigns). 
 71. See infra Part IV. 
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2. Who Qualifies for the Exemption for Foreign Sovereigns 
The benefit provided to foreign sovereigns by the Code is available 
not only to foreign governments themselves, but also to the “integral 
parts” and “controlled entities” of those governments.72  Integral parts 
include agencies and departments of the foreign government.73 By 
contrast, “[c]ontrolled entities are separate legal persons wholly owned 
and controlled by the sovereign that do not have governmental 
authority.”74 Controlled entities, even though they are legally distinct 
from the foreign sovereign, benefit from the tax treatment of foreign 
sovereigns because of their status as entities that are wholly owned by a 
foreign sovereign.75 However, this treatment only applies to entities that 
are not “controlled commercial entities.”76 A controlled commercial 
entity is an entity that is effectively owned by a foreign sovereign, and 
that engages in commercial activity anywhere in the world.77 If a 
controlled entity engages in commercial activity and thereby rises to the 
level of a controlled commercial entity, as defined in the Code, then it 
                                                                                                                 
 72. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.892-2T(a)(1) (“The term ‘foreign government’ 
means only the integral parts or controlled entities of a foreign sovereign”). The 
Treasury Regulation goes on to define both “integral part” and “controlled entity.”  
An ‘integral part’ of a foreign sovereign is any person, body of persons, organization, 
agency, bureau, fund, instrumentality, or other body, however designated, that 
constitutes a governing authority of a foreign country. The net earnings of the 
governing authority must be credited to its own account or to other accounts of the 
foreign sovereign, with no portion inuring to the benefit of any private person. 
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.892-2T(a)(2).  
The term ‘controlled entity’ means an entity that is separate in form from a foreign 
sovereign or otherwise constitutes a separate juridical entity if it satisfies the 
following requirements: (i) [i]t is wholly owned and controlled by a foreign sovereign 
directly or indirectly through one or more controlled entities; (ii) [i]t is organized 
under the laws of the foreign sovereign by which owned; (iii) [i]ts net earnings are 
credited to its own account or to other accounts of the foreign sovereign, with no 
portion of its income inuring to the benefit of any private person; and (iv) [i]ts assets 
vest in the foreign sovereign upon dissolution. 
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.892-2T(a)(3). 
 73. Treas. Reg. § 1.892-2T(a)(2). 
 74. May, supra note 60, at 391. 
 75. “[An SWF] formed to provide resources for the support of governmental 
functions and the common welfare generally is a controlled entity of the foreign 
government.” Id. at 392. 
 76. § 892(a)(2). 
 77. Id; see also May, supra note 60, at 391-92. 
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will not be entitled to claim the tax benefits afforded to foreign 
sovereigns.78 The argument for this distinction is similar to the rationale 
behind the tax treatment of ECI to foreign private investors.79 A 
controlled entity that is engaged in commercial activity will be 
competing with U.S. commercial entities.80 Offering a tax exemption to 
a controlled commercial entity would provide that entity (and the 
foreign sovereign who controls it) with a significant competitive 
advantage over its U.S. commercial counterpart. The policy of sovereign 
immunity does not justify providing foreign governments with such a 
competitive advantage. Therefore, any controlled entity that engages in 
commercial activity loses the tax benefit for foreign sovereigns.81 
Clearly, this is a strong incentive for foreign sovereigns and their 
controlled entities to avoid engaging in commercial activity.82 
3. Tax Benefits for Foreign Sovereigns 
Again, foreign sovereigns are, at a minimum, eligible for treatment 
as foreign corporate residents of their home countries.83 However, in 
addition to this (relatively advantageous) tax treatment, foreign 
sovereigns and their integral parts and controlled entities are also 
eligible for the tax benefits provided by § 892.84  The tax preferences 
                                                                                                                 
 78. § 892(a)(2); see also May, supra note 60, at 391-92 (“Because sovereigns 
govern through their integral parts, integral parts receive wider immunity. They can 
engage in commercial activities without losing the sovereign exemption for their 
noncommercial income. Controlled entities cannot. If they engage in any commercial 
activity, they lose their sovereign exemption entirely.”) (emphasis added). 
 79. See supra Part II.B. 
 80. This raises the question of what import it should have for U.S. tax purposes if a 
controlled entity is engaged in commercial activity outside the U.S. Currently, any 
commercial activity that a controlled entity engages in anywhere in the world will be 
sufficient to cause that entity to be treated as a controlled commercial entity for U.S. tax 
purposes. However, if the point of the provision is to level the playing field with regard 
to commercial activities engaged in within the U.S., then it is not immediately clear 
why non-U.S. activity should be a relevant factor. 
 81. § 892(a)(2). 
 82. “The typical concern of a[n SWF] is involvement in investments that might 
cause it to become taxable as a controlled commercial entity.” May, supra note 60, at 
392. 
 83. § 892(a)(3). 
 84. See id. § 892(a)(1). 
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provided in § 892 are statutorily provided benefits available to all 
foreign sovereigns earning income in the United States.85 As addressed 
earlier, the United States is a signatory to many tax treaties, some of 
which offer additional benefits to foreign sovereigns of the other 
signatory country.86  Later in this Article I will discuss the possibility of 
making the foreign sovereign tax exemption a treaty benefit, thereby 
limiting its extent, and simultaneously strengthening the U.S. position in 
asking for reciprocal treatment.87 For the moment, it is sufficient to 
remember that any benefits provided by § 892 are available to all 
foreign governments, their integral parts, and any of their controlled 
entities that are not controlled commercial entities. 
Section 892 exempts from U.S. taxation any investment income 
earned by a foreign government, its integral parts, or its controlled 
entities that is not earned from a commercial activity.88 The language of 
the statute provides an exemption, not on the basis of whether or not the 
income earned by the foreign sovereign is connected with the sovereign, 
governmental activities of that entity, but only if the income comes from 
investments or interest on deposits.89 The statute focuses the exemption 
on income earned from what are traditionally viewed as passive (or non-
commercial) activities.90 Indeed, the statute goes on to explicitly remove 
any income derived from commercial activities from the exemption 
provided by the previous paragraph.91 Reading these two paragraphs 
together, income of foreign governments from stocks or bonds, if 
derived from a commercial activity, will not qualify for the foreign 
                                                                                                                 
 85. See generally id. § 892. 
    86. Supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
    87. For a discussion of this issue, see infra section VII.  
    88. § 892. 
    89. § 892(a) (emphasis added). 
(1) In general. The income of foreign governments received from – (A) investments in 
the United States in – (i) stocks, bonds, or other domestic securities owned by such 
foreign governments, or (ii) financial instruments held in the execution of 
governmental financial or monetary policy, or (B) interest on deposits in banks in the 
United States of moneys belonging to such foreign governments, shall not be included 
in gross income and shall be exempt from taxation under this subtitle. 
 90. See id. Investing in stocks and bonds and earning interest on bank deposits are 
traditionally viewed as passive sources of income, also within the world of tax-exempt 
entities and the Unrelated Business Income Tax. See infra, Part VI. 
 91. “Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any income (i) derived from the conduct of 
any commercial activity (whether within or outside the United States) . . . .” Id.             
§ 892(a)(2)(A). 
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sovereign tax exemption, even though such income would qualify for 
that exemption if it had not been earned commercially.  
Remember, though, that income earned by the foreign sovereign in 
the form of interest on bank deposits (provided that the interest income 
was not earned in connection with a trade or business in the United 
States) would be exempt regardless of the application of § 892, because 
of the application of the exemption for interest on deposits provided in  
§ 871.92 Because the foreign sovereign receives all the tax benefits 
available to foreign corporations, the benefits of portfolio interest and 
the exemption for interest on deposits that are available to foreign 
corporations will also be available to foreign sovereigns, even if the 
income does not qualify for the exemption provided by § 892.93 As a 
result, the effect of § 892 is the tax exemption it provides to income 
earned in the form of dividends, where the dividend is primarily 
attributable to corporate income earned in the United States.94 
Importantly, the benefits available to foreign sovereigns under        
§ 892 are not available if the foreign sovereign (or its integral parts or 
controlled entities) is engaged in commercial activity.95 Unlike foreign 
private investors and the analysis applied to ECI, commercial activity by 
the foreign sovereign anywhere in the world will make that foreign 
sovereign ineligible for the benefits of the foreign sovereign tax 
exemption.96 Any income earned by a foreign sovereign that is derived 
from a commercial activity will be “commercial activity income” 
(“CAI”) and will be ineligible for the benefits of § 892.97 
One of the particularly severe elements of this rule stems from the 
“tainting” nature of commercial activity income. Obviously, any income 
                                                                                                                 
 92. § 871(i). 
 93. §§ 892(a)(3), 871(h). 
 94. § 871(i).  If the dividend is a payout of income earned primarily outside the 
United States, and if the dividend is paid to an owner with the relevant ownership 
percentage of the payor corporation, then the dividend would already be exempt from 
U.S. tax under the Code.  See § 871(i)(2)(B). 
 95. § 892(a)(2) (dealing with “Income Received Directly or Indirectly from 
Commercial Activities”). 
 96. Id. (“IN GENERAL – Paragraph (1) [providing a tax exemption] shall not 
apply to any income – (i) derived from the conduct of any commercial activity (whether 
within or outside the United States) . . .  .”). 
 97. Id. 
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that is itself earned by engaging in a commercial activity will be CAI. 98  
However, in addition, any other income—that is, income that is not by 
its origins CAI—is also treated as CAI if earned by the same entity that 
earned the CAI.99 That is to say, CAI taints non-CAI, making all income 
earned by an entity that earns any CAI ineligible for the foreign 
sovereign tax exemption.100 
Foreign sovereigns have a strong incentive to avoid engaging in 
activities that generate CAI.101 However, even if they do earn income 
that is statutorily defined as income generated by a commercial activity, 
foreign sovereigns are not subject to higher tax rates on that income than 
foreign private investors would be.102 But foreign sovereigns can easily 
plan around the tainting rule in order to isolate CAI and limit the 
possibility of tainting other income. Because income is not attributed 
from one of a foreign government’s controlled entities to another of its 
controlled entities, any foreign sovereign that expects to earn CAI can 
create an entity specifically to engage in activities expected to generate 
CAI. Doing so keeps that income segregated from any other income that 
is not CAI. While this structuring work can be expensive, it is a 
relatively straightforward way to avoid the tainting problem. Having one 
investment vehicle that only generates non-CAI, and a separate vehicle 
where all investments that might generate CAI are held, ensures that the 
                                                                                                                 
 98. § 892(a)(2)(A)-(B). 
 99. § 892(a)(2)(A)(ii) & (B). Because engaging in any commercial activity at all 
makes a controlled entity into a controlled commercial entity, and because any income 
earned by a controlled commercial entity is ineligible for the exemption, the 
commercial activity in effect taints the other non-commercial income of the controlled 
commercial entity. For instance, if a corporation that is wholly owned by a foreign 
government earns commercial income by operating a business, the corporation will 
meet the definition of a “controlled commercial entity.” As a result, all of its income 
will be ineligible for the § 892 exemption, even though some of its income might be 
dividend income resulting from the passive ownership of publicly traded stock.  If the 
foreign government owned the stock through another entity that was not a controlled 
commercial entity, then the dividend would be eligible for the § 892 exemption. The 
mere existence of some CAI earned by the controlled entity taints all the other income 
earned by that same entity. 
  100.       Id. 
  101. Income that is not identified as CAI and is not tainted by CAI is eligible for 
the exemption provided in § 892.  Earning CAI makes an entity ineligible for those 
benefits.  Therefore foreign sovereigns will want to minimize the amount of income 
they earn that is identified as CAI, and, if the generation of CAI is inevitable, they will 
want to isolate the CAI from all other income.     
  102.      § 892(a)(3). 
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non-CAI vehicle will qualify for the foreign sovereign tax exemption.103 
The CAI-generating vehicle will not qualify for the foreign sovereign 
tax exemption, but will still receive the relatively beneficial treatment 
afforded to foreign private corporations, provided that the income is not 
ECI.104 
 
D. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN PRIVATE 
CORPORATE INVESTORS AND FOREIGN SOVEREIGNS 
 
The exemption provided in § 892 provides important additional tax 
exemptions to the already preferential tax treatment received by foreign 
sovereigns due to their treatment as corporate residents of their own 
countries. Perhaps most notably, any dividends, which would be taxed 
for a foreign private investor at 30% (or a treaty-reduced 15% rate),105 
would be eligible for a complete tax exemption if received by a foreign 
sovereign.106 The effect of this, while advantageous for all foreign 
sovereigns, is particularly advantageous for foreign sovereigns who 
have not signed a treaty with the United States.107 For these countries, 
the withholding rate on dividend payments is reduced from 30% to 
zero.108 Even for countries that have signed tax treaties with the United 
States, the lowest dividend withholding rate that the United States 
                                                                                                                 
 103.  § 892(a)(1) & (2). 
 104. Because foreign sovereigns are, as a default treated as corporate residents of 
their countries, the commercial activity analysis is not necessary for determining all of 
their tax treatment. The tax treatment of a foreign sovereign’s income under the 
corporate non-resident rules will not depend on whether or not the entity has any 
income from a commercial activity. See § 892(a)(3). 
 105. § 871(a)(1); see also supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 106. Dividends are income from investments, and therefore qualify for the 
exemption provided by § 892. 
 107. Without a treaty benefit in place, foreign governments, subject to tax as foreign 
corporate investors from their home countries, would be subject to a withholding rate of 
30% on dividend payments received from the U.S. § 871. 
 108. § 892(a)(1). Note that, from a certain perspective, this may be a strong 
argument in favor of leaving the foreign sovereign tax exemption as a statutory benefit, 
rather than making it a treaty provision, as I argue later in this Article. Because it is 
typically only the relatively wealthy and powerful countries that have negotiated tax 
treaties with the United States, the costs of removing the statutorily provided tax 
preferences for foreign governments will fall most heavily on poorer and less politically 
powerful countries. For a further discussion of this issue, see infra Part VII.  
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typically agrees to is generally around 15%,109 so the statutory provision 
that lowers that rate to zero is meaningfully beneficial to all foreign 
sovereign recipients of dividends.110 
The primary additional benefit that foreign sovereigns receive as a 
result of § 892 relates to the taxation of interest. The only kinds of 
interest exempted from tax for foreign private corporate investors, as 
discussed above, are so-called “portfolio interest” and interest on 
deposits in banks.111 By contrast, § 892 provides foreign sovereigns, 
their integral parts and their controlled (non-commercial) entities, with a 
tax exemption for all earned interest.112 The effect of this, while 
relatively minor since § 871 exempts most types of interest, is that 
interest paid where the foreign sovereign is a greater than 10% owner of 
the issuer is still exempt from tax for that foreign sovereign.113 A 
similarly situated foreign private investor would be subject to 
withholding and income tax on that interest.114 
 
III. WHAT IS “COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY”? 
Any income that is generated to a foreign sovereign by engaging in 
a commercial activity will be ineligible for the foreign sovereign tax 
exemption.115 Clearly, then, one must understand just what commercial 
activity is. The Treasury Regulations under § 892 define commercial 
activity for purposes of the foreign sovereign tax exemption.116 This 
definition is remarkably broad. Anything that is an activity “with a view 
towards the current or future production of income or gain” is a 
commercial activity.117 This broad definition is narrowed by an explicit 
                                                                                                                 
 109. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 110. “The principal benefits of the sovereign exemption . . . are limited to portfolio 
dividends, contingent interest, interest from non controlled, 10% owned entities, and 
gain on interests in non-controlled U.S. real property holding corporations.” May, supra 
note 60, at 391. 
 111. § 871(h)-(i); see also supra notes 54 to 56 and accompanying text. 
 112. § 892(a)(1)(B). 
 113. Section 871 would not apply in such a scenario, but § 892 exempts all interest, 
regardless of ownership of the borrower. 
 114. § 871. 
 115. § 892(a)(2). 
 116. Treas. Reg. § 1.892-4T(b). 
 117. Id. (“In general. Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, all 
activities (whether conducted within or outside the United States) which are ordinarily 
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list of excluded activities.118 The excluded activities are primarily 
pursuits that are traditionally considered to be within the purview of 
governmental activities, such as cultural events, governmental functions 
and purchasing.119 Remember, the primary argument for offering a tax 
exemption to foreign governments in the first instance was a 
jurisdictional argument about the sovereign immunity of those foreign 
governments.120 On the sovereign immunity argument, these are the 
activities that should be exempted for foreign governments. In these 
instances, the foreign government is acting in its capacity as a foreign 
sovereign, and therefore, on sovereign immunity grounds, it should be 
entitled to a U.S. tax exemption. These particular activities, however, 
are not performed by SWFs.121 Most relevant for foreign sovereigns 
planning to invest in the United States, usually through a SWF, is the 
first activity that is identified in the Treasury Regulations as non-
commercial: investing.122 According to the Treasury Regulations, 
“investments in stocks, bonds and other securities, loans, [and] 
investments in financial instruments held in the execution of 
government financial or monetary policy . . . ” are not commercial 
activity. 123 While investing is clearly engaged in with a “view towards 
the current or future production of income or gain,” the exclusion of 
investing from the definition of commercial activity parallels the 
definition of ECI for foreign private investors. 124 Again, the difference 
                                                                                                                 
conducted by the taxpayer or by other persons with a view towards the current or future 
production of income or gain are commercial activities. An activity may be considered 
a commercial activity even if such activity does not constitute the conduct of a trade or 
business in the United States under section 864(b).”). 
 118. § 1.892-4T(c) (“Activities that are not commercial. – (1) Investments . . . (2) 
Cultural Events. . . (3) Non-profit activities . . . (4) Governmental functions . . . (5) 
Purchasing . . . .”). 
 119. Id. 
  120.     See supra notes 60 to 71 and accompanying text.  
 121. Remember the definition of SWFs offered earlier in this article—these are not 
governments operating in a governmental capacity, but merely pools of capital 
investing with the same goal as any other investor. See supra Part II.A. 
 122. Treas. Reg. § 1.892-4T(c)(1). 
 123. Id. § 1.892-4T(c)(1)(i). 
 124. This is the language used to define “commercial activity.” Treas. Reg. § 1.892-
4T(b). 
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relates to the “passive” or “active” nature of the activity that generates 
the income.125  
The Regulations go on to treat as “non-commercial” income that is 
earned by a foreign government by engaging in trading.126 The Treasury 
Regulations state that “effecting transactions in stocks, securities, or 
commodities for a foreign government’s own account does not 
constitute a commercial activity . . . .”127 Traditionally, trading is viewed 
as a less-passive (more active) income-producing activity than investing. 
However, the list of trading activities that are not commercial activities 
is more expansive than the list of investing activities that is included in 
the Regulations.128 In particular, the Regulations include trading 
commodities as a non-commercial activity, whereas investing in 
commodities is not explicitly identified as a non-commercial activity.129  
There is currently significant debate about the implications of this 
distinction, and the confusion about whether or not investing in 
commodities is, in fact, a commercial activity that will “taint” the other 
non-commercial income earned by an SWF in any particular year is 
likely having an effect on the amount of SWF investment in 
commodities. 
What is important to note here is that the list of “non-commercial” 
activities in the Treasury Regulations is meant to encompass the world 
of governmental activities entitled to sovereign immunity.130 It is these 
activities that Congress intended to exempt from tax when creating the 
foreign sovereign tax exemption. This adds to the incongruity of finding 
                                                                                                                 
 125. Id; see also infra Part VI. 
 126. Id. § 1.892-4T(c)(ii). 
 127. Id. 
 128. In particular, the Treasury Regulations explicitly identify trading in 
commodities as a non-commercial activity, but do not explicitly identify investing in 
commodities as non-commercial. One might extrapolate from trading back to the (less 
active) activity of investing, but it does seem strange that the Regulations explicitly 
include commodities in one subsection and not the other. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.892-
4T(c)(i) (identifying non-commercial investing activities, and not including investing in 
commodities), with Treas. Reg. § 1.892-4T(c)(ii) (identifying non-commercial trading 
activities, and explicitly including trading in commodities). 
 129. While this might seem an obvious point, there is a significant debate on this 
issue currently. In particular, see May, supra note 60, at 395-97; N.Y. ST. B.A. TAX 
SEC., REPORT ON THE TAX EXEMPTION FOR FOREIGN SOVEREIGNS UNDER SECTION 892 
OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 19-20, 27, 39-40 (2008). 
 130. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
2012]                    SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS                           1011 
 AND THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN TAX EXEMPTION 
 
 
“investing” on this list.131 A further discussion of how investing is 
viewed as “non-commercial” (or “non-business,” depending on the 
section) in other Code sections appears later in this Article.132 
 
IV. NON-TAX POLICY CONCERNS REGARDING  
INVESTMENTS BY SWFS 
 
If there were strong policy reasons for encouraging SWFs to invest 
in the United States then, absent other strong countervailing policy 
reasons (tax or otherwise) to discourage investment, the tax law should 
be crafted to encourage that investment. However, the non-tax rationale 
for encouraging SWF investment in the United States has not yet been 
clearly stated. On the contrary, there are strong reasons to be concerned 
about SWFs investing in the United States, and to establish a tax policy 
that does not unnecessarily encourage such investment. 
One of the most commonly repeated concerns regarding investment 
by SWFs (and, by implication, their foreign government owners) relates 
to national security concerns.133 This argument centers around the 
thought that a foreign government can obtain meaningful amounts of 
power over the United States through the use of its SWF by establishing 
the SWF as a significant actor in the U.S. economy and thereby 
becoming the owner of large amounts of U.S. equity interests. This 
power could exert itself in a number of ways. First, the foreign 
government, acting through the SWF, could negatively influence the 
U.S. economy by selling off large amounts of stock. Clearly any such 
action would also negatively affect the SWF itself, lowering the value of 
its U.S. investments. This would not be the action of a rational economic 
actor, and, indeed there is no evidence of any SWF engaging in such 
actions thus far.134 However, the possibility remains, and any tax policy 
                                                                                                                 
 131. Indeed, it feels a bit like that old Sesame Street song “One of These Things is 
Not Like the Others.” 
 132. See infra Part VI.  
 133. See Joint Comm. on Tax’n, Economic and U.S. Income Tax Issues Raised by 
Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment in the United States, supra note 1, at 30. 
 134. For a discussion of the behavior of SWFs and their investment strategies, see 
Lynann Butkiewicz, Nicholas Pettifer & Tom Young, Panic, 27 INT’L FIN. L. REV 22 
(2008); Philip Lader, Massive, Passive and Patient . . . or Naughty Knights to the 
Rescue?, 43 INTL. SOC’Y BARRISTERS Q. 403 (2008); Richard A. Epstein & Amanda M. 
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decision should reflect this possibility. Second, a foreign government, 
acting through its SWF, may take advantage of its ownership interest in 
a U.S. company to gain access to critical information, or to force the 
company to act in such a way that the SWF-controlled U.S. company 
becomes less competitive than its counterpart located in the SWF’s 
home country. Again, there is no evidence of a SWF having acted in 
such a way, and, in fact, SWFs have not yet taken more than a 10% 
ownership interest in any U.S. company.135 But, again, such scenarios 
should be contemplated when crafting a coherent tax policy. 
On the other hand, encouraging foreign governments to invest in 
the United States may have positive consequences for national security. 
Having a foreign government intricately invested in the stability of the 
United States’ economy will give these governments a financial 
incentive to help protect the United States and its economy.136 Any 
economic instability or security threat to the United States would have a 
meaningful financial impact on the SWFs invested here—an impact that 
the beneficiaries of those SWFs (the foreign governments themselves) 
will want to avoid. Therefore, on this theory, extensive SWF 
entanglement in the United States economy will positively affect 
national security and economic stability, to the extent that foreign 
governments have influence on those issues. 
As is clear from this discussion, there may be non-tax policy 
reasons to encourage SWFs to invest in the United States economy, but 
simultaneously there may be reasons to raise hurdles to such investment. 
Until there is clear legislative intent regarding investment by SWFs in 
the United States, tax policy should neither encourage nor discourage 
such investment, as compared to the general tax approach to investment 
by foreign entities. Unfortunately, the current statutory arrangement 
offers an additional tax advantage to foreign governments and SWFs 
                                                                                                                 
Rose, The Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Virtues of Going Slow, 76 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 111, 111 (2009); Justin O’Brien, Barriers to Entry: Foreign Direct 
Investment and the Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 42 INT’L LAW. 1231 (2008); 
Brendan J. Reed, Sovereign Wealth Funds: The New Barbarians at the Gate? An 
Analysis of the Legal and Business Implications of Their Ascendancy, 4 VA. L. & BUS. 
REV. 97, 99 (2009). 
 135. See Butkiewicz et al., supra note 134, at 2. 
 136. This analysis of investment is not new. As the proverb goes, “If you owe the 
bank $100, that’s your problem. If you owe the bank $100 million, that’s the bank’s 
problem.”  
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beyond what is available to foreign investors more generally.137 This tax 
subsidy is unjustified, as there is no current policy objective that the 
subsidy achieves. 
V. INCOMPLETENESS OF THE CURRENT RULE 
If the rationale for offering foreign governments a tax exemption is 
to respect their autonomy and their immunity from U.S. jurisdiction 
while performing governmental activities, then the current form of § 892 
and the affiliated Treasury Regulations fail in two respects. The rule is 
both too broad, offering a tax exemption for activities that are not, in 
fact, governmental activities, and too narrow, failing to provide a tax 
exemption for certain income earned by foreign governments while 
performing governmental activities. In this Part, I will turn to the 
narrowness concern. 
As I discussed earlier in this Article, the current rule providing a 
tax exemption for investment income to foreign governments earning 
such income in the United States cannot be justified by reference to the 
general rule of sovereign immunity.138 The current jurisdictional 
sovereign immunity rules provide immunity from the U.S. court system 
only to the extent that the foreign sovereign is engaged in a government 
activity. Congress has determined, however, that foreign governments 
engaged in commercial (as opposed to governmental) activity are 
subject to the jurisdictional authority of the U.S. courts.139 The tax rule 
attempts to track this distinction by allowing an exemption from United 
States taxation if income is earned by a foreign government engaged in 
governmental activities, but simultaneously denies that exemption to 
any income earned by a foreign government as a result of a “commercial 
                                                                                                                 
 137. In response to this, one might argue that there is also a tax preference for 
foreign investors that is not available to domestic investors. Indeed, non-resident 
taxpayers do not pay U.S. capital gain tax on investment gains they earn on U.S. 
securities, while their domestic counterparts are subject to that tax. If the taxpayer is 
resident in a country without a capital gains tax, such as Switzerland, then that taxpayer 
will receive her gains tax-free. This may also be an unjustified tax preference, but an 
analysis of that particular argument is outside of the scope of this Article. 
 138. See supra Part III. 
 139. Id. 
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activity.”140 Again, the rationale for taxing a foreign sovereign’s income 
from commercial activities is that a foreign government acting in a 
commercial capacity is a competitor to a U.S. resident taxpayer engaged 
in the same commercial activity. Providing a tax exemption to the 
foreign government would give that foreign government an unjustified 
competitive advantage. In addition, since the foreign government is not 
engaging in governmental activities related to its sovereign 
responsibilities, the rationale of sovereign immunity should not apply. 
Tax policy considerations that compete with the principle of sovereign 
immunity argue in favor of ensuring the competitiveness of resident 
taxpayers in the commercial arena, at least to the extent this can be 
affected by federal taxation.  However, despite this tax policy goal, as I 
have already explained, the Code and the Regulations go on to except 
investment activity from the definition of commercial activity.141 
Therefore, foreign government investors receive a tax-based competitive 
advantage as compared with their non-government foreign counterparts, 
and their U.S. resident counterparts, in the arena of investing. 
If the rationale for excluding commercial activities from the tax 
exemption provided to foreign governments is that commercial activities 
are not governmental activities, it is difficult to see how “investing” is 
properly categorized as a non-commercial (and therefore governmental) 
activity. Excluding investing from the definition of commercial activity 
means that foreign governments receive a tax exemption for income 
earned from investing, which seems to be primarily a non-governmental 
activity.142  
By contrast (and here is where the rule seems importantly too 
narrow), income earned by a foreign government that is earned from a 
governmental activity, but where that activity is not investment-related 
                                                                                                                 
 140. See § 892(a)(2)(A). 
 141. See Treas Reg. § 1.892-4T(c)(1). 
 142. One can imagine that this exemption for investing, when it was drafted in 1917, 
applied in very specific cases, radically different from its current application to SWFs. 
Imagine, for instance, that the government of France opens a new consulate in the 
United States. France will likely open bank accounts to support its consulate, and may 
even have certificates of deposit or a money market account in order to keep up with 
inflation. The exemption provided by § 892 protects any income France earns on these 
accounts from U.S. taxation. However, this example conceives of “investing” as a 
radically different thing than the current version of investing by SWFs, which more 
closely resembles the classic private equity model, and likely involves significantly 
higher dollar amounts accruing annually to the investors.. 
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will be ineligible for the exemption.143  This unintended consequence 
violates the policy rationale for providing the exemption in the first 
place. Sovereign immunity justifies exempting income earned by 
foreign governments in the performance of governmental activities.  
Whether that income comes in the form of investment income, or in 
another form altogether should be irrelevant to the provision of the 
exemption. 
The unintended taxation of the non-commercial, non-investment 
income of foreign governments arises because of the structure of the 
statute. Section 892(a)(1) states that income from investing or earned as 
interest on bank deposits is exempt from tax. Then Section 892(a)(2) 
says that if the income referred to in § 892(a)(1) is income from a 
commercial activity then it is not exempt.144 The Treasury Regulations 
go on to define commercial activity.145 But pause here for a moment. 
The only exemption offered in § 892 is to income earned by investment 
activity.146 There is no statutory tax exemption for income of a foreign 
government earned while engaging in governmental activities unless 
that income is investment income.147 
Imagine how this tax rule might apply in the case of a foreign 
government participating in a cultural festival in the United States. The 
foreign government may earn some income from its participation in the 
festival, perhaps from the sale of tickets, t-shirts or souvenirs. The 
Treasury Regulations under § 892 explicitly state that participation in 
cultural events is not commercial activity for the purposes of § 892.148 
However, does this mean that the income earned by this foreign 
government is therefore exempt from U.S. taxation? Not under the 
current statute. In order to qualify for the exemption provided by § 892, 
the income earned by the foreign government must be income from 
investment.149 This imagined income from a cultural festival is clearly 
not income from “investment in the United States in stocks, bonds, or 
                                                                                                                 
143.  See § 892(a)(1). Only income from investments and interest on deposits are 
exempted under § 892. 
 144. § 892(a)(1)-(2). 
 145. Treas. Reg. §1.892-4T(b). 
 146. § 892(a)(1). 
 147. Id.  
 148. Treas. Reg. §1.892-4T(c)(2). 
 149. § 892(a)(1). 
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other domestic securities . . . or . . . financial instruments held in the 
execution of governmental financial or monetary policy, or . . . interest 
on deposits in banks in the United States . . . ” which is the language 
authorizing a tax exemption for foreign governments.150 Therefore, this 
income would not benefit from the § 892 exemption, and would, in fact, 
be subject to tax in the United States. 
This example illustrates the way in which the structure of Section 
892 violates the policy behind providing the foreign sovereign tax 
exemption. The Treasury Department identified participation in cultural 
events as the kind of governmental activity that it had in mind when it 
listed such activity as an exception from “commercial activity” in the 
Treasury Regulations.151 But the current statutory structure ends up 
taxing income earned from that activity, rather than providing an 
exemption. A better model would provide a clear exemption for income 
earned by engaging in governmental activities, and then make an 
exception for commercial activities, rather than identifying income from 
investment as the only income for which the exemption will be 
provided. 
VI. ACTIVE/PASSIVE DISTINCTION IN THE TAX CODE 
The distinction between commercial and non-commercial activity 
in the context of the income earned by foreign governments in the 
United States has parallels in other sections of the Code. Indeed, many 
Code sections make a distinction for tax purposes between income that 
is earned actively and income that is earned passively.152 For instance, 
not-for-profit entities that qualify for a tax-exemption under § 501(c)(3) 
may earn income that is unrelated to their tax-exempt purpose on a tax-
                                                                                                                 
 150. Id. 
 151. Treas. Reg. § 1.892-4T(c)(2) (“Cultural Events – Performances and exhibitions 
within or outside the United States of amateur athletic events and events devoted to the 
promotion of the arts by cultural organizations are not commercial activities”). 
 152. See, e.g., § 864(b)(2)(A)(ii) (stating that trading in securities or commodities 
for a taxpayer’s own account does not rise to the level of a trade or business for U.S. tax 
purposes), and § 512(a)-(b) (defining “unrelated business taxable income” in the area of 
tax-exempt organizations, and then exempting from the definition of “unrelated 
business taxable income” “all dividends, interest, payments with respect to securities 
loans . . . amounts received or accrued as consideration for entering into agreements to 
make loans, and annuities, and all deductions directly connected with such income”). 
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free basis, as long as it is passive investment income.153  However, any 
income that a non-profit actively earns from engaging in a trade or 
business unrelated to its exempt purpose is taxed at corporate rates, 
rather than qualifying for exemption from federal income tax.154 The 
typical justification for this treatment follows the same lines as the 
argument for taxing foreign governments on their income from 
commercial activity.  If a non-profit entity were exempt from tax on its 
income from a commercial activity (so called “unrelated business 
taxable income” or “UBTI”), then it would have a competitive 
advantage compared with for-profit entities in the same field. If the 
activity in question is unrelated to the exempt purpose of the non-profit, 
then that advantage is unjustified.155 However, if the income is earned 
through passive investments, then the non-profit is exempt from tax on 
the income that it earns. 156 
The argument for allowing non-profit entities to earn tax-free 
investment income centers on their tax-exempt status. Generally 
speaking, if the entity is not-for-profit and has a charitable purpose, then 
its income should be exempt from tax, unless there is a clear reason to 
tax the income in question. The reason to tax unrelated business income 
is to avoid providing the entity with an unfair competitive advantage. 
There is no such competitive advantage with regard to investment 
income, therefore there is no need to impose tax on it. We can, as a 
policy matter, accept the tax-free nature of the non-profit’s investment 
income because the income will further the charitable purposes of the 
non-profit. 
This may be a convincing argument with respect to non-profits, as 
Congress and the IRS have made explicit decisions to exempt those 
entities from tax, and have identified the charitable purposes that justify 
                                                                                                                 
 153. See, e.g., § 512(b)(1). 
 154. See § 511 (imposing tax on the unrelated business income of charitable 
organizations), § 512(a) (defining unrelated business taxable income). 
 155. For a discussion of the rationale for instituting a tax on the unrelated business 
income of charitable organizations, see Treas. Reg. 1.513-1(b) (“The primary objective 
of adoption of the unrelated business income tax was to eliminate a source of unfair 
competition by placing the unrelated business activities of certain exempt organizations 
upon the same tax basis as the nonexempt business endeavors with which they 
compete.”). 
 156. Supra note 152. 
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their general tax-exemption. This charitable purpose rationale can then 
justify exempting the investment income of a non-profit from tax. 
However, there is no clear parallel to the charitable purpose of a non-
profit entity in the case of a foreign government. Congress has not 
clearly identified foreign governments as deserving of a tax exemption, 
and therefore the investment income earned by a foreign government 
should be treated more like the investment income of a private entity 
than like the investment income of a non-profit. 
International tax provides another example of the active/passive 
distinction in the income tax world. In determining whether or not a 
foreign individual has effectively connected income (“ECI”) for U.S. tax 
purposes, the Code looks to whether the taxpayer was actively engaged 
in the business, or was “merely” trading or investing.157 In this case, 
trading or investing on their own do not constitute a trade or business for 
U.S. income tax purposes, so income generated by trading or investing 
will not be treated as ECI for a foreign investor. If a nonresident 
taxpayer does have ECI, that income is taxed at the rates in effect under 
§ 1, making the nonresident taxpayer equivalent to the resident taxpayer, 
for federal tax purposes. The rationale for taxing ECI at resident tax 
rates again stems from a desire not to give tax preferences to foreign 
businesses that will advantage the foreign businesses as compared with 
their domestic counterparts. However, the tax preference given to 
trading and investment income cannot be justified on these same 
grounds. On the contrary, exempting investment income or income 
earned by trading for one’s own account from the definition of ECI, and 
thereby exempting it from the tax rates imposed by § 1, can give a 
significant competitive advantage to non-U.S. investors. Therefore, the 
same rationale that justifies exempting the investment income of non-
profit entities from tax does not apply in this context. 
While it is true that this active/passive distinction is present 
throughout the Code, in the sections mentioned above, as well as others, 
                                                                                                                 
 157. § 871(b) imposes a tax on income earned by a non-resident in a trade or 
business. “A nonresident alien individual engaged in trade or business within the United 
States during the taxable year shall be taxable as provided in section 1 [establishing 
resident tax rates] . . . .” § 871(b)(1). “Trade or business” is defined in § 864, which 
states that “the term ‘trade or business within the United States’ . . . does not include . . . 
(2) . . . [t]rading in . . . stocks or securities through a resident broker, commission agent, 
custodian, or other independent agent . . . [or] trading in stocks or securities for the 
taxpayer’s own account, whether by the taxpayer or his employees or through a resident 
broker, commission agent, custodian, or other agent . . . .” § 864(b)(2)(A)(i)-(ii). 
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a larger discussion of this distinction and its ramifications is outside of 
the scope of this Article. Given the changing nature of the economy, and 
the increasing presence of passive investors, it may be time to re-
evaluate the tax preferences available for passive investment income. 
Amending the active/passive distinction (in the form of the 
commercial/investing distinction) for foreign governments and SWFs 
does not necessitate a full re-evaluation of the active/passive distinction 
in other parts of the Code. The language describing “commercial” in the 
context of § 892 can easily accommodate investment activity, without 
implicating the definition of “active” or “passive” in other Code 
sections. This narrow focus is part of what makes the foreign sovereign 
tax exemption so ripe for change. Any alteration of the law can be done 
narrowly, without necessarily implicating other Code sections, where 
Congress is not yet prepared to change the law. 
VII. TAX EXEMPTION AS NEGOTIATION TOOL 
An additional problem with the current form of the foreign 
sovereign tax exemption is the universality of the statutory structure. 
Since the United States offers a statutory tax exemption to all foreign 
sovereigns who invest in the United States, there remains no negotiation 
tool to ensure that the United States and its controlled entities and 
integral parts receive the same treatment in other countries.158 Under 
current law, the United States offers a foreign sovereign tax exemption 
to a number of countries that do not offer the same exemption in return. 
A country need not have negotiated a tax treaty with the United States in 
order to benefit from the foreign sovereign tax exemption. Since it is 
provided as a statutory matter, even countries with whom the United 
States has never signed a tax treaty are beneficiaries of the provision. 
Many of these countries do not have statutory foreign sovereign tax 
                                                                                                                 
 158. One might argue that we do not always need to receive reciprocal treatment in 
order to make a policy decision.  In other words, if the policy is good, the United States 
should offer it as a statutory matter, regardless of whether other countries provide the 
same benefits to the United States.  This may be true in other circumstances where there 
are good policy justifications for the rule, but, as I have argued in this Article, there is 
no good justification for the foreign sovereign tax exemption, so, at a minimum, the 
United States should be getting something in return when it offers this subsidy to 
foreign governments investing in the U.S. 
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exemptions, and therefore the United States does not have the benefit of 
an exemption on income it earns in those countries. As a practical 
matter, since the United States does not currently have a federal SWF, 
there may be less pressure at the national level to seek such an 
exemption. However, there are U.S. entities that could benefit from a 
provision paralleling the current provision in Section 892. For instance, 
the Alaska Permanent Fund and CALPERS are both entities that would 
qualify for the benefits of a foreign equivalent of Section 892.159 
Arguably, some good things do come out of the statutory provision 
of the foreign sovereign tax exemption.  The United States primarily 
signs tax treaties with wealthier and more politically powerful nations.160 
A country with whom the United States has not yet signed a tax treaty 
might need the revenue it can generate by investing and earning income 
in the United States.  That country might benefit tremendously, and 
possibly quite justifiably, from the exemption provided statutorily to 
foreign sovereigns by Section 892.  However, the revenue lost through 
the unjustified provision of the exemption to the richest countries 
investing the largest amounts in the United States far outweighs the 
possible social justice gains at the margins.  If the U.S. government 
elects to engage in international relief work, it will be much more 
effective to engage in the subsidies of foreign governments directly than 
to do so through the statutory provision of a tax exemption to all foreign 
governments investing and earning income in the United States.   
As a foreign policy matter, there is no clear reason why the United 
States should offer tax benefits to foreign governments (and their 
integral parts and controlled entities) when these benefits are not 
available to the United States in return. Indeed, the fact that the 
exemption is offered as a statutory matter means that the United States 
also provides a tax exemption (and thereby financial support) to 
countries that it might not wish to support.161 There is no good policy 
reason, neither foreign policy or tax policy, for providing such benefits 
while receiving nothing in return. 
                                                                                                                 
 159. For a discussion of the U.S. entities that would qualify as Sovereign Wealth 
Funds, see Fleischer, supra note 1. 
 160. See, e.g., note 49 for the list of countries with whom the United States has 
signed a tax treaty. 
 161. It is surprising, for instance, to think that at the same moment that we were at 
war with Iraq and Afghanistan, our Code was providing an exemption from tax on any 
income those governments might have earned in the United States. 
2012]                    SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS                           1021 
 AND THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN TAX EXEMPTION 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
I have argued that the current tax treatment of SWFs, as an 
extension of the foreign governments that own them, is both unfair and 
incomplete. The current model is unfair, because it offers to SWFs an 
unjustified additional tax exemption beyond that offered to foreign 
private corporate investors. The lack of clear legislative intent 
authorizing such a tax preference makes this violation of horizontal 
equity indefensible. In addition to this inequity, the current statutory 
model is incomplete, as it does not actually achieve the underlying 
Congressional goals related to sovereign immunity. The principle of 
sovereign immunity aims to exclude foreign sovereigns from U.S. 
jurisdiction, including its taxing jurisdiction, when those sovereigns are 
engaged in governmental activities. However, the structure of the 
foreign sovereign tax exemption statute allows a foreign government to 
earn income from its governmental activities which, if that income is not 
income from investments, will be subject to tax in the United States. 
Therefore, the current statutory model fails on both counts. 
In this Article I have proposed that Congress amend Section 892 to 
ensure that all income earned by a foreign government engaging in 
governmental activities will be exempt from tax in the United States. 
Simultaneously, Congress should remove the provision exempting 
foreign sovereigns (and, by extension, SWFs) from U.S. tax on 
investment income, and instead offer such exemptions, when they are 
desirable, through negotiation as a treaty provision. This change would 
allow the exemption to be more narrowly tailored to satisfy the goals of 
its original enactment, and would also ensure that the United States 
receives comparable tax treatment in return. 
 
